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I Introduction 
This paper compares and figures out the characteristics of the interfirm 
relations which have been formed between the major indigenous motorcy-
cle manufactures and their major components suppliers in China, Taiwan, 
and India. 
In Ohara [2001] , the author has exemplified the clear difference in the 
patterns of forming interfirm relations between the final motorcycle 
manufactures (hereafter, maker) and their important first tier network 
firms that supply important parts to the maker (hereafter, supplier) in 
Japan and China. In Japan, manufactures have formed "integrated-type" 
(or "united-type") interfirm relations, whereas in China, major indigenous 
makers and suppliers have formed "dispersed-type" (or "isolated-type") 
relations (which will be described later) (see also Ohara [2006] ) . 
However, the study has a significant weakness in explaining the causes 
of such difference. By directly comparing firms in Japan, an advanced 
economy, and China, developing country, it can not tell whether this gap 
has been caused mainly by their difference in their sheer developmental 
stages, or by other factors rooted in the inherit characteristics of their 
economic systems; 
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This paper aims to make up for this weakness by comparing China with 
India, whose positions in the stages of economic development is similar to 
China than Japan. Including another late-industrializer, Taiwan, may also 
help us to check the problem. 
This study shows, in conclusion, that as far as the type of interfirm rela-
tions is concerned, Chinese firms have followed very different develop-
ment paths in motorcycle industry, whereas Taiwan an India seem to have 
followed more similar path to Japanese counterparts. 
The background interest behind the study is to find out the diversity in 
the patterns of late-industrialization among these countries and the main 
causes that brought about them. The result of this paper will provide one 
of necessary bases for our future challenges for the, theme. 
II Data and Interviewed Firms 
Concerning China, we mainly observed China Jialing Industrial Co., 
Ltd (hereafter, Jialing) and Chongqing Zongshen Motorcycle Group 
(hereafter, Zongshen), and 14 suppliers (7 for Jialing and 7 for Zongshen) 
that had/have specifically important relationships with them. Jialing is a 
state-owned large maker that initiated the development of Chinese 
motorcycle industry, as a pioneer and largest maker, in 1980s and early 
1990s. Jialing deteriorated its market performance in the latter half of 
1990s, however, in the former half of the first decade after the year 2000, 
it recovered until it became China's second largest maker (in production). 
Zongshen is a young maker which was established in early 1990s, and it is 
one of the most typical and successful privately-owned makers that grew 
very rapidly in the late 1990s by purchasing and assembling external stan-
dardized parts of existing dominant models. Jiali jng represents. traditional 
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state-owned large makers that used to form an integrated interfirm orga-
nization in 1980s, whereas Zongshen represents new makers that utilized 
dispersed interfirm relations in 1990s. The author conducted surveys on 
these two makers and their suppliers twice, firstly in 1998-99 and secondly 
in 2002-04, and observed the changes during the interval period (Ohara 
[2006] ). 
Concerning Taiwan, Kwangyang Motor Co., Ltd.(hereafter, KYMCO) 
and its 6 important suppliers were observed in 2004 and 2005. 4 out of 
the 6 suppliers surveyed were capitally affiliated by KYMCO. In Taiwan, 
Yamaha Motors Taiwan Co., Ltd.(hereafter, Taiwan Yamaha) and its im-
portant suppliers were also surveyed to make a comparison with KYM-
CO. 
In India, Bajaj Auto Ltd. (hereafter, Bajaj) and its 7 important sup-
pliers were surveyed. For a comparison, Hero Honda Ltd. (a maker 
capitally affiliated by Honda, hereafter, Hero Honda) and related sup-
pliers were also surveyed. 
In Taiwan and India, we surveyed the latest status and changes since 
1990s. The status of interfirm relationship before 1990s was not directly 
observed this time but related questions on the status then were also 
asked during the interviews. An outline of surveyed firms is presented in 
the Appendix. 
III Overview of the Motorcycle Industry in Three Countries 
Almost 90% of world motorcycles are now produced and consumed in 
Asia (production-unit-wise), and 25 million motorcycles, more than a half 
of them, are produced in China, and 8 millions,· about 1/4 of them, are 
produced in India in 2007 (Figure 1). While the size of motorcycle pro-
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duction in Taiwan is not large (about 1.5 million), but its penetration per 
capita is the world highest. l) These three countries occupy critical and un-
ique positions in world motorcycle industry. 
It should be noteworthy that, in these countries, indigenous makers 
stand in the leading, position in the industry in each country (Table 1). In 
Taiwan, KYMCO, San yang Motor Co., Ltd. (hereafter San yang), and 
Taiwan Yamaha occupy about one third of market share each, with the 
sum of their shares exceeding 90%. KYMCO, along with San yang, is the 
oldest motorcycle maker in Taiwan. In India, there are more large 
motorcycle makers than Taiwan, but 75% of the market share is still 
occupied by top 3 makers. Bajaj is India's oldest and most leading 
motorcycle maker, and, though it was overtaken by Hero Honda in mar-
1) Every 1.9 person owns one motorcycle on average. 
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Table 1 Motorcycle Manufactures in China, Taiwan, and India (2003) 
Foreign capital Production Domestic Chief Makers market 













Yamaha 51% 326.0 24.3 




Honda 26% 2,033.0 36.7 
1,198.0 21.6 
TVS Motor Company Ltd. 893.0 16.1 
India 
Honda Motorcycle & Scooters Ltd. Honda 100% 310.0 5.6 
Yamaha 100% 232.0 4.2 
196.0 3.5 
Kinetic Engineering Ltd. 141.0 2.5 
a few other makers 9.7 
Sources: ZQGNB (2004), Shih and Chen (2004), and SIAM (2004). 
ket share from the mid 1990s, Bajaj is still no. 2 and is increasing its mar-
ket share steadily in recent years. 
The picture of the Chinese motorcycle industry is very different from 
Taiwan and India. There are more than 150 officially-registered makers 
and their market share is very dispersed. No single firm has large enough 
market share to influence the rest. Jialing used to have as large share as 
llO (262) 
around 114 until early 1990s. At that time, 80% of the market had been 
occupied by 10 largest firms, and all of them were state-owned firms. 
However, as domestic market expanded in an unprecedented pace in mid 
1990s, many new makers competitive in price, including Zongshen, 
emerged and many of traditional state-owned makers including Jialing de-
clined not only in market share but also in absolute production size. It is 
noteworthy that, only in China, the share of Japanese-affiliated makers is 
very minor (the total sum of the shares of 9 Japanese-affiliated makers in 
China is as small as 10%). 
There is a large disparity in the motorcycle industry between China and 
Taiwan/India in terms of the harshness of price competition. In Taiwan 
and India, sharp drop in motorcycle price can not be observed during 
1990s. But in China, the average price has fallen as much as 40% during 
the 10 years from the early 1990s, despite the fact that their main pro-
ducts were upgraded from 100cc to 125cc during the same period. 
One of the critical technical reasons of Chin's sharp drop in motorcycle 
prices was that, since 1990s, numerous makers have produced redundantly 
the "imitations" or "minor-change versions" of small number of standar-
dized (dominant) models (which are originally developed by Japanese 
makers) (Ohara [2001] ). In Taiwan and India, large makers develop and 
produce their own unique models, and such a blatant and harsh price 
competition as China experienced among many homogeneous makers has 
not been observed in the two countries. 
IV Comparison of Interfirm Relations in Three Countries 
This section compares the interfirm relations between Asian motorcycle 
makers and their important suppliers. For comparison, we set two ideal 
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types of interfirm relations, and compare the Asian makers' interfirm re-
lations to them to distinguish their organizational characteristics, similar-
ities, and differences. 
An "Integrated-type" is an organization of division of labor where the 
core maker sets a common target for suppliers, exerting active leadership 
over them in managing the mechanisms of incentives and monitoring to 
enhance the capabilities of the network as a whole. It also can be de-
scribed as "united development type" since they try to upgrade their capa-
bilities in a united manner. "Dispersed-type" is an ~rganization where 
the leadership of the core maker is weak, with fewer sharing of common 
goals and information/knowledge, and suppliers are seeking for their own 
upgrading of capabilities in an isolated manner. We can call it as "iso-
lated development type" as well. 
The critiCal points to classify the two ideal types are following four2l: 1) 
"maker's outsourcing structure"; how the maker divides in-house and out-
sourced parts, 2) "multi-sourcing" and "dependency"; how the maker 
gives competition to the rival suppliers that supply identical parts to the 
maker, 3) "risk sharing" and 4) "supplier development activities"; how 
the maker deal with suppliers directly in transactions. Point 3) shows how 
the risk arisen in developing new products is shared between them, and 
point 4) shows what kind of activities .makers are· initiating to upgrade 
suppliers' capability. 
1 Maker's Outsourcing Structure 
Table 3 and 4 show the makers' outsourcing structure, showing the 
situation at latest surveys and trend of change. Changing direction of 
2) This section is based on the analytical framework of Fujimoto [1998]. 
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Table 3 Outsourcing Structure of Asian Makers (1) 
Employee Outsourcing Ratio 
2003, 04 change 2003, 04 Change 
China -~~~~~~----- _____ ?_~?~-~~~~---:----~~?~~--~?! ___ -------~~~?-~-----~-------------------
Zongshen 3900 (04) i t 90 i 
Taiwan KYMCO 2900 (04) 60-70 
India Bajaj 11000 (05) 21000 ('97) 85 50 ('90s) 
Honda 25700* >80 
Japan ' ' -------------- --------------------.-------------------- -------------------,-------------------
' ' 
: 73 : Yamaha 23100* 
* including automobile segment 
Source: Interview by the author, Annual Report of Bajaj Auto Co. (various years) 
Table 4 Outsourcing Structure of Asian Makers (2) 
No. of Suppliers Affiliated Suppliers 
2003, 04 i no. foreign collab. 
Jialing >300 ~ several 1 (cab.) 
China -------------- ---------------- ·---------------- ----------------------------------------------
Zongshen 500 several 0 
Taiwan KYMCO 130- 6 6 (cab. sus, cru. Ele, etc) 
India Bajaj 210 1400 ('97) non . non 
Honda 200 >30 
Japan -------------- ----------------r---------------- ----------------------------------------------
Yamaha 200 several 
Source: Interview by the author, Annual Report of Bajaj Auto Co. (various years) 
China in the tables is judged by comparing the first survey in late 1990s 
and the second survey in 2003-04 (for the detail of China, see Ohara 
[2006] ). 
The outsourcing ratios3l of KYMCO and Jialing are lower than 
3) The ratio of purchased material/parts cost to the manufacturing cost. The author acquired 
this data though his own interviews, however, some of interviewees may be misunderstood the 
definition. 
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Japanese makers. Jialing has tendency to produce important parts in-
house. KYMCO has established several affiliated suppliers in collabora-
tion with Honda's affiliated Japanese suppliers. However, KYMCO is in-
creasing in-house parts production capabilities such as carburetor, which 
may be brought about by the recent stagnation of production. 
It is noteworthy that Bajaj has fairly high outsourcing ratio, and this is 
the result of Bajaj's drastic transformation of purchasing policy under 
"vender rationalization policy". Bajaj used to produce in-house as much 
as 50% of necessary parts and to purchase the rest from as many as 1400 
suppliers in mid 1990s. The outsourcing policy at that time was such that 
· they produce by itself as much as possible, purchase critical parts from 
foreign affiliated suppliers or import from abroad, and use many suppliers 
to make unimportant parts. However, from the late 1990s, it began to 
switch many in-house processing to outsourced parts,4l and re-organized 
"flat-layer" type suppliers organization into more "multi-layer" or "hierar-
chic" type, by selecting capable 1st tier suppliers and arranging many 
others as 2nd and 3rct under them. 5) The primary aim of this re-organiza-
tion is to enhance the capability of developing new models (Bajaj Annual 
Report 2002). By doing so, Bajaj can focus more resources to new model 
development activities, having more parts development activities out-
sourced to 1st tier suppliers. With such arrangements, Bajaj put emphasis 
on initiating activities to upgrade technological capabilities of suppliers. 
Compare to KYMCO, Bajaj, and Jialing, Zongshen has fairly higher 
outsourcing ratio. As stated above, high outsourcing ratio is the result of 
4) Suppliers i-3 and i-5 in this study, employed staffs who spun-off from Bajaj during the pro-
cess. 
5) Supplier i-7 became 1st tier supplier of muffler unit during the process. 
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their technological characteristics when they started their business in 
1990s. However, it should be noted that, from late 1990s, Zongshen is in-
creasing the kind of parts manufactured/processed in-house. 
A common characteristic aspect observed in Chinese two makers is that 
they use more suppliers than others. The recent number of suppliers they 
use for Jialing is 300 and 500 for Zongshen, and they used to transact 
with even larger number of suppliers in the late 1990s. This is the result 
of their "multi-sourcing" policy, as will be discussed soon. Chinese two. 
makers have few affiliated suppliers, whereas Japanese makers and KYM"" 
CO have several affiliated suppliers especially in key parts. In this point, 
Bajaj does not have capitally affiliated suppliers, either. 
2 Multi-Sourcing and Dependency Rate 
"Dependency rate" in Table 5 is the (average) ratio of the sales to main 
transaction partners ( 4 makers of 3 countries) out of all the sales of main 
products6l of the surveyed suppliers. Average dependency of Bajaj's sup-
pliers (to Bajaj) is the highest, 70%, and that of Chinese suppliers is the 
lowest. The dependency rate of KYMCO is in the middle. Concerning 
the direction of change of dependency ratio, the figure is in the direction 
of declining in China and Taiwan, whereas it is increasing in India. The 
"number of transaction partners" in Table 5 is the number of the maker 
that the supplier is in a transaction relationship simultaneously. The fi-
gure is smallest in India and the highest in China, too. In sum, transac-
tion relationship is the most closed in India, the most open in China, and 
Taiwan falls in the middle. 
6) Not the whole sales of the supplier. If the supplier is selling various kinds of products, the 
dependency on the maker in sales will be less than the figure appeared in the Table. 
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As for the situation of multi-sourcing, Bajaj utilizes single-source policy 
in most cases. This is noteworthy if the maker's recent very rapid expan-
sion of production volume is remembered. By the author's interview, Ba-
jaj said that they use single source policy with suppliers of 80% parts. 
From maker's perspective, under the single source transaction, the maker 
can more easily conduct technical evaluation and monitoring of each 
supplier /l and from suppliers point of view, they can make commitment 
(transaction specific investment) with more confidence. However, since 
the supplier can enjoy the monopolistic position on the transaction of the 
parts, for the maker, there is the risk that moral hazard problem occurs in 
suppliers. 
According to the interview at KYMCO, their basic policy is to use two 
suppliers for one identical parts. However, the most of the suppliers in 
this survey answered that their transaction with KYMCO is basically done 
by single-source-base. This may reflect the bias of sample caused by the 
fact that the suppliers surveyed by this study are mostly producing the critical 
7) The maker can secure traceability of problematic parts, as well. 
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parts and many of them have capital relationships with KYMCO. 
In contrast, we could not observe any cases of single-source base trans-
action in China. Top management of Zongshen said to the author that 
"If we concentrate our transaction ·to one supplier, it is often the case that 
we can not control them. That is why we use two suppliers for every 
single parts". Jialing also answered in the same way. However, accord-
ing to suppliers, the two makers often purchase an identical part from 
more than three suppliers. It is probably because the two-source policy of 
the top management is not completely penetrated into terminal staffs in 
charge of purchase for some reason. s> However, we can also observe the 
trend that makers are. concentrating transactions to smaller number of 
suppliers in comparison to the late 1990s, having the ratio of two-source 
transaction become higher than that time. 
3 Risk Sharing9> 
Table 6 shows the way of sharing of development cost of new product 
(motorcycle parts). For the sake of convenience of observation, we dis-
cuss mainly the sharing of die/mold cost that occupies a significant part of 
development cost. In this table, "fully paid by maker" means that the 
maker with assurance undertakes the depreciation of all the die/mold cost. 
"Fully paid by supplier" means that the maker does not assure the 
depreciation10>. In this case, if the products did not sell well, the loss will 
8) According to suppliers, such cases sometimes happen that maker's staffs in charge of purchase 
pursue personal benefit (bribe) and change arbitrarily the transaction partners. 
9) Analytical framework of this section is based on Asanuma [1997]. 
10) Even when the depreciation of die/mold cost is not assured by the maker, if the new product 
sells in large enough volume, the supplier can complete the depreciation by adding it into selling 
price. However, if products do not sell well and could not complete the depreciation, the loss 
will be undertaken by the supplier that developed the new parts. In this sense, all the develop-
ment risk is undertaken by suppliers in that case. 
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China 
n 
Table 6 Risk Sharing 
Dev't cost (die/mold) 
--------------,--------------·-------------- The risk of 
Fully paid i h . i Fully paid dev't failure 
, sanng, . by maker : : by suppher 
Unpayment 
!_i~!~? ________ ! __ ______ ? ______ +------~------~------~------ ----~~~~~~---- ___ s_~~~~~~~--
Zongshen 7 : 3 : 3 high sometimes 
KYMCO 6 5 0 low non 
Taiwan -(~1i) _______ --12-- ------8------r-----2------:------2------ ------1~~------ ------~~~------
Bajaj 7 2 4 low non 
' ' India ------------ ------- -------------,--------------,-------------- ---------------- ----------------
' ' (all) ' ' ' ' 
' ' 
8 3 4 low non 
Source : Interview by the author 
be undertaken fully by suppliers. In this sense, all the development risk 
is bored by the supplier. "Sharing" means that, by providing advanced 
payment or assuring a part of the mold/die cost, they are sharing the risk. 
According to Table 6, KYMCO undertakes most of the development 
risk of suppliers. KYMCO has institutionalized the mechanism of mak-
er's risk absorption, under which suppliers are expected to make more 
commitment to product development. This is the same way of Japanese 
makers. Such a system can be manageable only in ·the situation where 
makers and suppliers share information/knowledge on the technology that 
suppliers use, and maker can make proper evaluation of the concrete cost 
of development based on the shared information. 
On the contrary, Chinese makers make suppliers undertake most of the 
risk. When the development fails (meaning the product does not sell well 
in the market), suppliers take all the risk. The failure rate of develop-
ment is high in China. In particular, in the late 1990s, many suppliers 
answered that the rate of success (meaning the possibility the supplier can 
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depreciate the development cost) was around 20%. Despite the high fai-
lure rate, during the period, since there existed so many suppliers who 
seek for business opportunities, makers did not find difficulty to find 
transaction partners. In practice, suppliers also had measures to reduce 
their risk. Since their products were imitation or minor-change version of 
dominant models, suppliers could find other makers who would buy them. 
In addition, suppliers transferred their risks to their own (2nd tier) sup-
pliers in the same way. In 1990s, nonpayment behavior was so wide-
spread over the business. When makers do not make payment to 1st tier 
suppliers, the suppliers also do not make payment to 2nd tier suppliers. 
Under such a circumstance, both the makers and suppliers were reluctant 
to make "transaction specific" investment, and their products become 
more and more "homogeneous" from parts level. Makers and suppliers 
were reluctant and actually unable to share technological 
information/knowledge between them. When defective parts were 
"found", makers simply returned them without analyzing true causes of 
the defections (meaning without knowing whether the parts were really 
defective) and even asked suppliers for compensations. However, it is 
noteworthy that, in 2003-04, the second survey in China revealed that 
more firms were beginning to share development cost compared to the 
late 1990s. Firms were more deliberate and using more systematic 
method to implement development projects, which made the rate of de-
velopment failure decrease and had declined the risk of supplier signifi-
cantly. 
The cooperative system between Jialing and important suppliers until 
early 1990s should be mentioned here. n) During the period from the early 
11) There are good literatures that introduced Jialing's interfirm cooperative system until/ 
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1980s to early 90s (around 1993), Jialing had formed and managed with 
several important suppliers12) a kind of closed group called "Jialing 
Motorcycle Economic Complex" (hereafter, "the complex"). The task of 
member suppliers was to localize the imported key parts of new models 
that Jialing introduced from Honda. Jialing coordinated the calculation of 
target cost of suppliers by sharing information with them. When some 
suppliers failed in achieving the goal, Jialing compensated a part of the 
losses from the pooled profit within "the complex" where Jialing exerted 
leadership in re-distributing them. In that sense, unlike after the late 
1990s, Jialing had formed interfirm organizations with suppliers (though 
limited in number) where the maker played a central role in sharing risks 
among networks, by partly absorbing risks by itself, during 1980s. In the 
early 1990s, however, Jialing began to seek for maximization of produc-
tion volume and the complex began to be dissolved. 
Concerning India, according to Table 6, Bajaj's suppliers are also 
undertaking die/mold cost as in the case of Chinese firms. The difference 
with China is that failure rate of development is very low and nonpay-
ment behaviors were not o~served in Bajaj's case. In reality, it would to 
say that the development costs were virtually born by Bajaj, but the 
method of the sharing was not well institutionalized as in Taiwan. 
4 Supplier Development 
Makers can practice "supplier development" activities, by which the 
maker takes various kinds of measures vis-a-vis suppliers to promote their 
'\.early 1990s (Zhongguo Motuoche Gongyeshi Bianji Weiyuanhui ed. [1995] and Zhang [1995]). 
The description here is mainly based on them but also is supplemented by author's interviews. 
12) In 1990, 12 suppliers were listed as formal members of the complex. 5 suppliers (c-3,4,5,6, 
and 7) out of 7 surveyed by this study used to be the member. 
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·capability upgrading toward the directions that the maker expects (Leen-
ders [1965], Krause [1997] ). "Supplier development" activities include 
direct measures to enhance transaction specific capabilities and indirect 
ones to develop infrastructural (multi-purpose) capabilities, including 
technological/financial assistance, personnel exchange, information shar-
ing, stabilization of transactions (for ex. concentration of orders to speci-
fic suppliers), etc. 
As mentioned above, under "vender rationalization policy", Bajai be-
gan to concentrate transactions to smaller number of 1st tier suppliers 
which have development capabilities. Since then, Bajaj has practiced 
several activities to nurture them. All the suppliers surveyed by this study 
participates TPM (total productivity maintenance) activities that Bajaj has 
initiated since around 2000. Typical case of Bajaj's "supplier develop-
ment" observed by the study is muffler supplier i-7. Before the policy 
change, Bajaj used to purchase parts related to exhaustion system from 
about 100 suppliers. However, from the end of 1990s, Bajaj designated 5 
suppliers from them as unit parts (1st tier) supplier, and supplier i -7 came 
to manage the integration of many 2nd tier suppliers. Along with the 
change, i-7 accepted financial support at the initial phase and technical 
support form Bajaj including personnel exchanges. Bajaj also initiates 
technological learning of i-7 with 2nd tier suppliers. 
An interesting point found in the survey about Bajaj's suppliers is that 
all the 6 metal-processing suppliers surveyed emphasized their effort in 
raising their own closely related 2nd tier suppliers, and they say some of 
the 2nd tier suppliers only make transaction with them. It is their en-
deavor to become superior 1st tier supplier with stable quality and deliv-
ery. The effort to raise 2n<\ suppliers was not very emphasized in the sur-
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vey, not only in China, but also in Taiwan. This may suggest that in In'-
dia, the capacity gap between firms of different tiers in the hierarchy is 
far larger than in Taiwan and China. 
Concerning KYMCO, except for the concentration of order to selected 
suppliers, concrete cases of the supplier development efforts were not 
mentioned during the survey. In particular, suppliers evaluate more high-
ly about Taiwan Yamaha's activities, whereas, according to them, KYM-
CO is not active in supplier development and is not enough technically 
knowledgeable to do such arrangements effectively. 
Several suppliers surveyed by this study include the ones that have 
capital affiliation from KYMCO, and they accept managers and, in one 
·case (t-4), engineers from the maker. Most of the suppliers surveyed 
have ever introduced technology from foreign countries, in particular 
from Japan. 13) It seems that suppliers have strong tendency to pursue 
their development independently from KYMCO, compared to India's 
cases. 
Concerning Chinese two makers, like KYMCO, not many concrete 
cases were observed during the survey, in particular in the late 1990s. 
Until 1980s, Jialing provided supportive actions to the member suppliers 
of "the complex" including technological training opportunities (via Hon-
da) and financial support. However, in the late 1990s, such cooperative 
activities were seldom observed. During 1980s, Jialing tried to nurture 
capable suppliers that could manufacture parts based on the design draw-
ings developed by Honda. However, in 1990s, as many suppliers who had 
this type of capability emerged, Jialing came to find little necessity to 
13) 5 suppliers out of 6 KYMCO's suppliers, and 5 out of 7 other suppliers had technical coopera-
tion (including capital affiliation) with foreign firms. 
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raise such suppliers by themselves14l. Jialing, at that time, also pursued 
massive expansion of production volume, and began to purchase parts 
from many suppliers since there were few large suppliers that could 
enough mass production capacity. In the late 1990s, however, disorder of 
supplier system caused by such changes brought Jialing series of quality 
problems. 
Zongshen, on the other hand, was more active than Jialing in 1990s. 
Zongshen started to manage "quality assurance system" with its important 
suppliers with whom they established "Zongshen Group". 15l Under this 
scheme, Zongshen in collaboration with suppliers make operation stan-
dard, and engineers of Zongshen circulate routinely the suppliers and 
monitor whether or not they are operating properly as designated in the 
standard. However, in the second survey in 2004, such circulation was in-
terrupted except for c-13. The reasons of interruption was that, since the 
capability raised by such system is an infrastructural (multi-purpose) capa-
bility such as producti9n management, and since suppliers supply similar 
parts to Zongshen's many rivals, Zongshen found it does not pay for 
them. In 2004, however, Zongshen started a few new collective schemes 
in cooperation with important· suppliers, including market (dealer) visiting 
project or discussion with material suppliers. Such collective coordination 
to enhance technological capability is noteworthy, though, at the time of 
the survey, they did such activities as ad hoc projects, not "routine" acti-
vities institutionalized in ordinary operations. 
14) The member suppliers of "the complex" were all public-owned and were tended to be accused 
as "inefficient", compared to newly emerged firms. In fact, some suppliers also admitted their 
managerial inefficiency at that time during the surveys. 
15) All the 7 suppliers surveyed in this study for Zongshen (c-8-14) were members of the "Zong-
shen Group". 
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V Conclusion 
In sum, during 2003-05, Bajaj has formed a cooperative interfirm orga-
nization with important suppliers that is the closest to typical "integrated 
type" than Taiwan and China. They shared risks and practiced active 
supplier development activities and have strengthened their integrity dur-
ing this several yea~s. 
The interfirm relations of KYMCO can also be included as a kind of 
"integrated type", where the transaction are stable and the rule of the 
maker's absorption is well institutionalized. However, it is also true that 
their relationships are more open and supplier development activities are 
not active. The integrity of the relationships tends to be looser for this 
several years. 
On the contrary, the interfirm relationships of Chinese makers are "dis-
persed" type, in particular in the late 1990s. Their relationship has been 
more open and unstable, and the sharing of risks has not been practiced. 
In particular in 1990s, such tendency was prominent under the circumst-
ances of very frequent failures of development and blatant risk transfer-
ring and nonpayment. However, after 2000, the relationship is transform-
ing to the direction of "integrated type", as shown in our observations 
such as makers' higher concentration of order to less number of suppliers, 
less prominent risk transferring, and beginning of more systematic sup-
plier development activities. 
From the above observations, we now can claim that, ·at least on the in-
terfirm relationships in motorcycle industry in this decade or so, China 
has followed a fairly unique path of industrial development compared to 
Japan, Taiwan, and India. 
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We then need to proceed to explore the factors that have caused such 
uniqueness in China, including the influence of the different ways of capa-
bility formation both in-house and within network, which will be our next 
challenge to be tackled with. 
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Appendix: List of the Suppliers Surveyed 
Name of No.of Main Product Main 
Capital 
EsuYbebaEr 岡of田 tI Firm Employees Customer Relations 
t-1 200 Meter KYMCO Japan 1977 
t-2 150 Handle switch (elec.) KYMCO KYMCO， Jap. 1980 
t-3 75 Switch， Lock KYMCO 1974 
t-4 119 Clutch KYMCO KYMCO， Jap. 1992 
t-5 468 Shock absorber KYMCO KYMCO， Jap. 1969 
t-6 289 Carburetor KYMCO Jap， KYMCO， 1981 SYM 
t-7 191 Lock Yamana T 1982 
t-8 109 Engine Geer Yamana T 1962 
t-9 250 Wheel Yamana T 1974 
t-10 95 Rubber tube Yamana T 1978 
t-11 390 Shock absorber Yamana T Japan 1964 
t-12 80 Frame SYM 1974 
t-13 78 Bearing non 1981 
i-1 500 Ignition Coil Bajaj Taiwan 1971 
i-2 130 Lamp Bajaj 1961 
i-3 200 Trans. Gear Bajaj 1999 
i-4 72 Frame， Gear case Baj吋 1984 
i-5 50 Engine Gear Bajaj 1985 
i-6 900 Cylinder Bajaj 1973 
i-7 300 Mu妊ler Bajaj 1974 
i-8 2，000 Die Casting Parts Hero Honda 1986 
i-9 260 Battery TVS Japan 1970 
c-1 280 Electric parts (CDI.) Jialing 1988 
c-2 300 Carburetors Jialing Jialing， Jap. 1994 
c-3 5，500 Carbur.， valve， FWM Jial泊g 1964 
c-4 1，040 Engines Jialing 1960 
c-5 400 Drum brakes Jialing 1983 
c-6 200 Handling bars Jialing 1970 
c-7 500 Muffler Jialing Jialing 1982 
c-8 220 Shock absorbers Zongshen 1986 
c-9 500 Crank shafts Zongshen 1992 
c-10 170 Cylinders Zongshen 1994 
c-11 670 Transmission gear Zongshen 1997 
c-12 900 Cylinder heads Zongshen 1994 
c-13 2，000 Crank case Zongshen 1991 
c-14 400 Crank shafts Zongshen 1984 
